A History of Government Attempts to Compromise Encryption and Privacy

The dance between maintaining national security and protecting individual privacy has been complex, shaped by the evolving landscape of technology. And it’s not over yet - not by a long shot.

Decrypt-o-cracy

In an age where our lives are increasingly digital, encryption has become the unsung hero of our online world. It is the invisible shield that protects our messages, secures our financial transactions, and keeps our personal data away from prying eyes. But here is the thing: while we have been busy sharing, swiping, and clicking, there has been a long-running backstage drama playing out between governments and the guardians of this technology.

Encryption is not just an invention born in The Valley. Its roots stretch back through history, intertwining with tales of wartime secrecy, Cold War tensions, and the birth of the digital revolution. Throughout this journey, governments worldwide have been keenly interested in this powerful tool - sometimes as its champion, but often as its would-be master.

The Foundations: World War II to the Cold War Era

The modern history of encryption and government intervention traces its roots to World War II and extends through the Cold War, a period that saw unprecedented advancements in cryptography and codebreaking. These developments laid the groundwork for future government attempts to control and compromise encryption technologies.

During World War II, the ability to secure communications while deciphering enemy messages often determined the outcome of critical operations. The most famous example is the breaking of the German Enigma code by Allied cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park, including Alan Turing. This success, along with the breaking of other Axis ciphers like the Japanese Purple code, demonstrated the strategic value of both creating and compromising encryption systems.

The war also spurred the development of more sophisticated encryption devices. The American SIGABA machine, for instance, remained unbroken throughout the conflict, highlighting the importance of strong encryption for national security. These wartime efforts led to the establishment of permanent signals intelligence agencies in many countries post-war, most notably the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States in 1952.

As World War II gave way to the Cold War, the importance of cryptography only grew. Both the United States and the Soviet Union invested heavily in developing more advanced encryption methods while also attempting to compromise each other's systems. The VENONA project, a long-running U.S. counterintelligence program that decrypted Soviet intelligence communications, exemplified the ongoing battle in the realm of cryptography.

The Cold War era also saw the rise of computer-based cryptography. Government agencies, often operating in secrecy, were at the forefront of this revolution. The development of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) in the 1970s, with input from the NSA, marked a significant milestone. 

The period from World War II through the Cold War also cemented the government's view of encryption as a dual-use technology – both a vital tool for national security and a potential threat if used by adversaries. This perspective would shape government policies and actions regarding encryption for decades to come, such as when the United States began to treat it as a weapon – subjecting it to strict export controls as part of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act (we will talk more about this in a bit).

As we move into the latter part of the 20th century, We will see how these foundational attitudes and policies began to clash with the rapidly evolving landscape of personal computing and digital communication, leading to new challenges in the balance between government control and individual privacy.

Export Controls: Encryption as a Munition

Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. government maintained a tight grip on the export of strong encryption technologies, classifying them as munitions under the Arms Export Control Act. This classification placed encryption software in the same category as weapons, subjecting it to strict controls and oversight. The impact of these restrictions was far-reaching and shaped the global landscape of digital security for years to come.

One of the most significant consequences of these export controls was the creation of a two-tiered system for software products. Many U.S. companies found themselves forced to develop weaker "international" versions of their software to comply with export regulations. These watered-down versions, with deliberately weakened encryption, were the only options available to customers outside the United States. This not only put international users at a security disadvantage but also hindered the global adoption of strong encryption standards.

The restrictions didn't just affect large software companies. Smaller firms and individual developers also found themselves in the crosshairs of these regulations. A notable case was that of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), developed by Phil Zimmermann. The publication of PGP's strong encryption software led to a criminal investigation, highlighting the serious legal risks associated with distributing robust encryption tools.

In response to these restrictions, the tech community devised creative workarounds. One ingenious method involved printing encryption source code in books. Since books were protected under the First Amendment and not subject to export controls, this allowed the code to be legally exported. This "book loophole" demonstrated both the determination of encryption advocates and the increasing impracticality of controlling the spread of encryption knowledge.

As the 1990s progressed, the rationale for these strict export controls began to erode. Several factors contributed to their gradual relaxation. Tech companies, recognizing the importance of strong encryption for their products' security and their international competitiveness, engaged in intensive lobbying efforts. Legal challenges were mounted, questioning the constitutionality of treating encryption as a munition and arguing that code was a form of speech protected by the First Amendment.

Perhaps most significantly, there was a growing recognition within the government and business sectors that strong encryption was essential for the burgeoning field of e-commerce. As online transactions became more common, the need for robust security measures became impossible to ignore. The potential economic benefits of a secure internet began to outweigh the perceived security risks of widespread strong encryption.

By the late 1990s, these combined pressures led to a substantial relaxation of encryption export controls. This shift allowed for the broader distribution of strong encryption tools and laid the groundwork for the widespread use of encryption we see today. However, the legacy of these controls lived on, both in the delayed global adoption of strong encryption standards and in ongoing debates about government control over encryption technologies.

The Clipper Chip

In 1993, the Clinton administration introduced a proposal that would become a pivotal moment in the history of encryption policy. The Clipper Chip initiative represented one of the first major public debates about government attempts to compromise encryption in the name of national security and law enforcement.

The Clipper Chip was designed as a hardware-based encryption device for voice communications. What set it apart—and ultimately led to its downfall—was its built-in feature allowing government access under certain conditions. This access mechanism was at the heart of the administration's attempt to balance the growing need for strong encryption with law enforcement's desires to maintain wiretapping capabilities in the digital age.

At the core of the Clipper Chip was a classified encryption algorithm called Skipjack, developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). Each chip contained a unique key, essentially a digital signature, that would be held in escrow by the government. The idea was that with proper legal authorization, law enforcement agencies could obtain this key, allowing them to decrypt communications made using the chip.

The government's vision was for the Clipper Chip to become a standard component in communication devices, providing strong encryption for users while preserving the ability for lawful interception. However, this vision was quickly met with resistance from multiple fronts.

Technology companies expressed concern about the impact on their products and international sales. Privacy advocates saw the chip as a threat to civil liberties and a potential tool for government overreach. Cryptography experts criticised the Skipjack algorithm's classified nature, arguing that security through obscurity was a flawed approach.

As the debate unfolded, technical vulnerabilities in the Clipper Chip system came to light. In 1994, researcher Matt Blaze discovered a flaw that could potentially allow someone to use the chip for secure communication while circumventing the key escrow feature – essentially defeating its purpose.

The combination of public opposition, industry reluctance, and technical shortcomings led to the gradual abandonment of the Clipper Chip proposal. By 1996, it was clear that the initiative had failed to gain traction, and the government quietly moved away from the concept.

The Clipper Chip episode had lasting implications. It marked one of the first times that encryption policy became a matter of widespread public debate. The controversy helped to galvanise the cybersecurity community and privacy advocates, leading to increased scrutiny of government initiatives in cryptography. Moreover, it set the stage for ongoing discussions about the balance between national security, law enforcement needs, and individual privacy rights in the digital age.

The NSA and Dual_EC_DRBG

In the early 2000s, the National Security Agency (NSA) became involved in the development of encryption standards, particularly in the area of random number generation, which is crucial for effective encryption.

The Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Dual_EC_DRBG) was standardised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2006, with significant input from the NSA.  However, the algorithm quickly raised suspicions in the cryptographic community, and in 2007, cryptographers Dan Shumow and Niels Ferguson presented research suggesting that Dual_EC_DRBG  could contain a backdoor.

In 2013, documents leaked by Edward Snowden confirmed that the NSA had indeed deliberately inserted a backdoor into Dual_EC_DRBG.

Operation Rubicon: The Crypto AG Scandal

In February 2020, a report revealed one of the most extensive and long-running intelligence operations of the 20th century. Operation Rubicon, a joint venture between the CIA and West German intelligence (BND), had successfully compromised the encrypted communications of more than 100 countries for decades. At the centre of this operation was Crypto AG, a Swiss company with a reputation for neutrality and security.

From the 1970s to the early 2000s, Crypto AG was a leading supplier of encryption devices to governments worldwide. Unknown to its customers, the company was secretly owned by the CIA and BND. This clandestine ownership allowed Western intelligence agencies to build backdoors into the encryption machines, effectively giving them access to the sensitive communications of dozens of nations.

The scope and duration of Operation Rubicon are remarkable. For nearly half a century, the CIA and BND were able to monitor diplomatic cables, intercept messages, and access phone conversations of both allies and adversaries. This extensive intelligence gathering proved valuable during numerous global events and crises.

During the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, the operation allowed U.S. officials to monitor Iranian communications, providing important insights into the ongoing situation. In 1982, as the Falklands War unfolded between the United Kingdom and Argentina, intercepted communications gave the British a significant advantage. Even the delicate negotiations leading to the historic Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978 were subject to this far-reaching surveillance operation.

The effectiveness of Operation Rubicon stemmed from its exploitation of trust. Crypto AG, operating from neutral Switzerland, was viewed as a reliable and impartial provider of security solutions. Countries seeking to protect their communications from foreign surveillance ironically turned to a company secretly controlled by U.S. intelligence. This deception went undetected for decades.

When the Washington Post and German broadcaster ZDF exposed Operation Rubicon in 2020, it prompted significant international discussion. The revelation raised important questions about the trustworthiness of commercial encryption products and the extent of government involvement in supposedly neutral companies. It also illustrated the lengths to which intelligence agencies would go to gain access to encrypted communications.

The impact of the Crypto AG scandal continues to be felt. It has intensified debates about privacy, national security, and the ethics of intelligence gathering. For many countries affected by this operation, it has led to a reevaluation of their security protocols and increased scrutiny of foreign-supplied encryption technologies.

Other Attempts

As discussions continue about government access to encrypted communications in the digital age, the story of Operation Rubicon serves as a notable example of the potential consequences when governments gain secret access to secure communications. Other notable instances include:

The FBI and Apple Dispute (2016): The FBI sought to compel Apple to create a backdoor to access an encrypted iPhone belonging to one of the San Bernardino shooters. Apple refused, citing the dangerous precedent it would set.

The EARN IT Act (2020): This proposed legislation, while aimed at combating child exploitation, raised concerns that it could be used to undermine end-to-end encryption.

The Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act (2020): This bill proposed requiring manufacturers to assist law enforcement in accessing encrypted data if served with a warrant.

International Perspectives

While this article has focused primarily on U.S. government actions, it is important to note that many countries have attempted to compromise or control encryption:

China: Requires foreign companies to use government-approved VPNs, which could potentially allow state monitoring.

Russia: Passed laws requiring messaging services to provide encryption keys to security services.

Australia: Passed the Assistance and Access Bill in 2018, which can compel tech companies to provide access to encrypted communications.

The history of government attempts to compromise encryption and privacy is long and complex. From the Clipper Chip to Operation Rubicon, from export controls to backdoored algorithms, these efforts have taken many forms over the decades. While the stated intentions often involve national security or law enforcement, these attempts have consistently raised concerns about privacy, security, and the potential for abuse.

As encryption continues to play a crucial role in our digital lives, the tension between government desires for access and the need for strong, trustworthy encryption persists.